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Resumen 
Introducción− Los teóricos del juego cooperativos han estudiado la estructura 
de coalición y los esquemas de pago atribuidos a esas coaliciones. En relación al 
valor del pago, hay varias maneras de obtener la “mejor” distribución del valor 
del juego. El concepto de solución o la distribución del valor de recompensa que 
se mantiene canónicamente para dividir justamente el valor de una coalición se 
llama Valor de Shapley. Es probablemente el esquema de pago más importante 
en los juegos cooperativos. La razón por la cual el valor de Shapley ha sido el 
foco de tanto interés es que representa un acercamiento distinto a los problemas 
de la interacción estratégica compleja que la teoría del juego intenta resolver.
Objetivo− Este estudio tiene como objetivo hacer una breve revisión bibliográ-
fica de la aplicación del Valor de Shapley para resolver problemas en diferentes 
campos de cooperación y la importancia de estudiar los métodos existentes para 
facilitar su cálculo. Esta revisión se centra en la visión algorítmica de la teoría 
cooperativa de juegos con un énfasis especial en las cadenas de suministro. 
Adicionalmente se propone un algoritmo para el cálculo del Valor de Shapley y 
se utilizan ejemplos numéricos para validar el algoritmo propuesto.
Metodología− En primer lugar, se identificaron los algoritmos utilizados para 
calcular el valor de Shapley. También se identificó los elementos que forman 
una cadena de suministro. Luego se simula la cooperación entre los miembros 
de las vías de la cadena de suministro y se calcula el valor de Shapley utilizando 
el algoritmo propuesto para comprobar su aplicabilidad.
Resultados y Conclusiones−  El enfoque algorítmico introducido en este 
documento no pretende menospreciar las contribuciones hechas hasta ahora, 
pero tiene la intención de proporcionar una solución directa para problemas de 
decisión que involucran cadenas de suministro. Una manera eficiente y factible 
de calcular el valor de Shapley cuando las estructuras de jugador se conocen de 
antemano proporciona la ventaja de reducir la cantidad de esfuerzo en el cálculo 
de todas las estructuras de coalición posibles antes del Shapley
Palabras clave− Juegos cooperativos, valor de Shapley, cadena de suministro, 
competitividad, clúster.
Abstract
Introduction− Coalitional game theorists have studied the coalition struc-
ture and the payoff schemes attributed to such coalition. With respect to the 
payoff value, there are number ways of obtaining to “best” distribution of 
the value of the game. The solution concept or payoff value distribution that 
is canonically held to fairly dividing a coalition’s value is called the Shapley 
Value. It is probably the most important regulatory payoff scheme in coali-
tion games. The reason the Shapley value has been the focus of so much 
interest is that it represents a distinct approach to the problems of complex 
strategic interaction that game theory tries to solve. 
Objective− This study aims to do a brief literature review of the application 
of Shapley Value for solving problems in different cooperation fields and the 
importance of studying existing methods to facilitate their calculation. This 
review is focused on the algorithmic view of cooperative game theory with a 
special emphasis on supply chains.  Additionally, an algorithm for the calcu-
lation of the Shapley Value is proposed and numerical examples are used in 
order to validate the proposed algorithm. 
Methodology− First of all, the algorithms used to calculate Shapley value 
were identified. The element forming a supply chain were also identified. 
The cooperation between the members of the supply chain ways is simulated 
and the Shapley Value is calculated using the proposed algorithm in order 
to check its applicability. 
Results and Conclusions− The algorithmic approach introduced in this 
paper does not wish to belittle the contributions made so far but intends to 
provide a straightforward solution for decision problems that involve supply 
chains. An efficient and feasible way of calculating the Shapley Value when 
player structures are known beforehand provides the advantage of reducing 
the amount of effort in calculating all possible coalition structures prior to 
the Shapley
Keywords− Cooperative games, Shapley value, Supply chain, competitive-
ness, cluster.
Shapley Value: its Algorithms and Application to Supply Chains 
El valor de Shapley: sus Algoritmos y 
Aplicación en Cadenas de Suministro
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17981/ingecuc.13.1.2017.06 
Artículo de investigación. Fecha de Recepción: 16 de octubre de 2016. Fecha de Aceptación: 26 de diciembre de 2016
Daniela C. Landinez-Lamadrid 
Fundación Centro de Investigación en Modelación Empresarial del Caribe. Barranquilla (Colombia)
dlandinez@fcimec.org
Diana G. Ramirez-Ríos 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. New York (Estados Unidos)
Fundación Centro de Investigación en Modelación Empresarial del Caribe. Barranquilla (Colombia)
ramird2@rpi.edu, dramirez@fcimec.org
Dionicio Neira Rodado 
Universidad de la Costa. Barranquilla (Colombia)
dneira1@cuc.edu.co 
Kevin Parra Negrete 
Universidad de la Costa. Barranquilla (Colombia)
kparra7@cuc.edu.co 
Johana Patricia Combita Niño 
Universidad de la Costa. Barranquilla (Colombia)
jcombita22@gmail.com 
Para citar este artículo: 
D.C. Landinez-Lamadrid, D. G. Ramirez-Ríos, D. Neira Rodado, K. Parra Negrete and J.P. Combita Niño “Shapley Value: its algorithms 
and application to supply chains,” INGE CUC, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 61-69, 2017. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17981/ingecuc.13.1.2017.06
62
SHAPLEY VALUE: ITS ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATION TO SUPPLY CHAINS
I. Introduction
The free trade philosophy has forced companies 
throughout the globe to compete with organizations 
that are bigger and more competitive. This situation 
has threatened the sustainability of many compa-
nies and productive chains [1]. Therefore, many pro-
ductive chains and companies are forming coalitions 
in order to be more competitive, hence they are more 
capable to face foreign competition. Nevertheless, 
cooperation brings also new challenges to organiza-
tions. For example, the introduction of cooperation 
in supply chain management has increased the im-
portance of existing methods for coordination, oper-
ations management and profit allocation according 
to benefits obtained from each cooperation activity. 
This coordination is possible through Cooperative 
game theory, where all players cooperate in order 
to achieve overall benefits and not affect their own 
personal benefits [2].
Coalitional game theorists have studied the co-
alition structure and the payoff schemes attributed 
to such coalition. With respect to the payoff value, 
there are number ways of obtaining to “best” dis-
tribution of the value of the game. One desirable 
criterion is fairness: assessing the extent to which 
each player contributed to the coalition’s value. The 
solution concept or payoff value distribution that is 
canonically held to fairly divide a coalition’s value 
is called the Shapley Value [3]. Shapley Value is a 
way to attribute the economic output of a team to 
the individual members of that team [4]. It is prob-
ably the most important regulatory payoff scheme in 
coalition games [5].
The reason the Shapley value has been the focus 
of so much interest is that it represents a distinct 
approach to the problems of complex strategic in-
teraction that game theory tries to solve [6]. Many 
authors have developed or implemented methods 
based on the Shapley value to boost cooperation 
within alliances. For example, Quigley & Walls 
[7] proposed a mechanism for obtaining fair prices 
and ensuring the reliability of negotiation between 
suppliers. Yu, Dong-Mei, & Xiao-Min [8] solved the 
problem of fair and equitable distribution of benefits 
in an alliance. Xin-Zhong & Xiao-Fei [9] developed 
a study to allocate the cost of delivery between sup-
pliers rationally. Yu, et al. [10] applied Shapley Val-
ue decomposition and other methods to determine 
carbon emission reduction target allocation. Liao, 
et al. [11] conducted a case study on initial alloca-
tion of Shanghai carbon emission trading based on 
Shapley value. Sheng & Shi [12] presented a cost 
allocation model for telecommunication infrastruc-
ture based on the Shapley Value algorithm. These 
studies highlight the application of Shapley Value 
for solving problems in different cooperation fields 
and the importance of studying existing methods to 
facilitate their calculation.
 This paper is focused on the algorithmic view of 
cooperative game theory with a special emphasis on 
supply chains. It is organized as follows: Section 2 
introduces the fundamental concepts and principles 
of the cooperative theory; in Section 3 a number of 
algorithms found in literature for calculating the 
Shapley value are reviewed; in Section 4, a nu-
merical example is developed and a Shapley Value 
algorithm is presented to solve the problem, and 
Section 5 present conclusions and future research 
directions. 
II. Literature Review
Cooperative game theory goes back to John von 
Neumann (1928) and since then it has been widely 
studied over the past five decades. Its applications 
cover a great number of disciplines. Nowadays it 
has been incorporated in economics, military sci-
ence, political theory, sociology and ethics theory. 
Game theory, as part of the rational choice theory, 
promises to substantially contribute to unifica-
tion of social disciplines. Ho, Hsu, & Lin (2011) 
defined Game Theory as the study of mathemati-
cal models of conflict and cooperation between 
decision-makers characterized by being rational 
and intelligent subjects. Thus, game theory can be 
divided into two branches, called non-cooperative 
and cooperative. 
The most widely studied cooperative game model 
is that of characteristic-function game. This simple 
model proves to be sufficient to capture the proper-
ties of many cooperative scenarios [13]. A coopera-
tive game (or game characteristic function) is speci-
fied by a pair (N, v) where N is a set of n agents and 
v: 2N → R is the characteristic function that assigns 
a value v(S) to every subset S ⊆ N, representing 
the value that agent in S can obtain and distribute 
among all coalition members (including himself) if 
they cooperate (only) with each other [14]
Different approaches for solving cooperative 
games are found in literature, the most common 
are presented in the following subsections.
A. Core 
The core is an important concept of coalition games. 
It combines all the principles that cover what is 
known as a feasible coalition according to John Nash. 
Given S is a feasible set, (u, v) the profits that two 
players would receive if they acted together, (u*, v*) 
the minimum value that each player would be will-
ing to accept and (ū, v- ) the cooperation solution, the 
principles exposed by Nash are:
1. Individual rationality: (ū, v- ) ≥ (u*, v*)
2. Feasibility: (ū, v- ) ∈ S
3. Pareto optimality: (ū, v- ) ∈ S y(u, v) ≥ (ū, v- ), so 
(u, v) = (u*, v*)
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4. Independence from irrelevant alternatives: (ū, v- ) 
∈ T ⊂ S and (ū, v- ) = φ(S, u*, v*), then (ū, v- ) = φ(T, 
u*, v*)-
5. Independence from linear transformations given 
a set T extracted from S by the following trans-
formation:
u’ = α1u+ β1
v’ = α2u+ β2
As φ(S, u*, v*) = (ū, v- ), the following relation is 
obtained
φ(T, α1u* + β1, α2v*+ β2) = (α1ū + β1, α2v* + β2).
6. Symmetry. Assume S is a set such that
(u, v) ∈ S ↔ (u, u) ∈ S
7. Suppose also that u* = v* and that φ(S, u*, v*) = 
(ū, v- ), then (ū = v- ).
According to Theorem IX. 1.2 [15] it is possible 
to define a function φ in all problems expressed as 
(S, x*, y*) satisfying the axioms discussed above. The 
lemma IX. 1.3 [15] states that for any of the points 
(u, v) ∈ S, such that u > u*, v > v*, there exists a sin-
gle point (ū, v- ), which maximizes the function g(u, 
v)= (u - u*)(v - v*)in the set S, for which u ≥ u*.
According to this, a reasonable allocation plan x= 
{x1,x2,...,xn} should meet the following conditions:
1. Sj ≠ ∅
2. Si ∩ Sj = 0
3. ⋃∈Sj =N (grand coalition)
4. v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(s)+ v(T ) for any S, T ⊆ N, such that 
S ∩ T = ∅
∑xi ≤ C(S) ∀S ⊂ N
 i∈S
(1)
∑xi ≤ C(S)
 i∈S
(2)
xi ≥ 0 (3)
B. Nucleolus
According to Dabbagh & Sheikh-El-Eslami [16], ev-
ery cooperative game has one and only one nucleo-
lus, and the nucleolus is in the core unless the core is 
empty. The aim of using the nucleolus concept is to 
fairly allocate the total profit, which is jointly earned 
by all transactions. Defining k_fu as a binary coeffi-
cient that indicates the presence (1) and the absense 
(0) of unit u in combination of f, the obtained profits 
can be organized as Π_f for 2^U-1 combinations. So 
the Nucleolus can be expressed as:
Minimize ε
Subject to
∑kfu Πu ≥ Πf - ε
  u
C. Other solution Concepts 
Once the value that maximizes the benefits of each 
of the members of the coalition are obtained, it is 
necessary to determine the adequate distribution of 
the quantity v(N ). This quantity can be represented 
by the vector x, which must satisfy the principle of 
efficiency (equation 5).
∑xi = v(N )
i∈N
(5)
The majority of the solution concepts, proposed 
for cooperative games, must satisfy the principle 
of rational individuality, which establishes that xi 
≥ v({i})∀i ∈ N. The pre-imputations that verify this 
principle are known as imputations of the game (N, 
v), denoting as I(v) the set of all of them. This prin-
ciple, together with the property of superadditivity 
of coalitions, is accounted by the first solution con-
cept, defined previously as the core of the game. This 
concept of solution was introduced by Gillies and is 
defined as the set C(v) = x ∈ Rn ∶ x(N ), x(S) ≥ v(S), 
∀S ∈ 2n,
Where,
x(S)=∑xiy x(∅) = 0.
            i∈N 
(The core of the game could be empty)
Another used approach is the concept of Kernel 
solution. In this concept agents are organized into a 
set of coalitions C={Ci} and their surpluses are cal-
culated as shown in Equation 6.
e(C) = v(C)-∑ui
                                Ai∈C
(6)
Where, ui is the payoff of agent i and v(C) is the 
payoff that the whole coalition obtains. 
The maximum surplus SAB of agent A on agent B, 
considering the coalition configuration is defined in 
equation 7.
SAB = max e(C)
 C|Ai - C, B ∉ C| (7)
Agent A overcomes agent B if SAB > SBA and uB > 
v(B). If neither of them overcomes the other, then 
they are in equilibrium (i.e. one of the following con-
ditions must be met for equilibrium):
1. SAB = SAB
2. SAB > SBAyuB = v(B)
3. SAB > SBAyuA = v(A)
A Kernel Stable Coalition (K-stable) is a set of 
coalitional configurations, such that each pair of 
agents within the same coalition is in equilibrium. 
The Kernel is a type of solution that uses the sur-
plus of each of the S ⊂ N sub-sets of a set of S play-
ers. Is defined by of the following equation:
θk (x) = e(Sk, x) (8)
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Being S1, S2, …, S2n subsets of N, ordered accord-
ing to the following relation:
e(Sk, x) ≥ e(Sk+1, x) (9)
The order established in (9) indicates how pay-
ment vectors, X, are assigned to the different sub-
sets. The core of the game, v, on a set (X ), is a set 
v(X ) defined in equation 9.
v(X ) = {x|{ x ∈ X                  si y ∈ X, ent. x ≤ y } (10)
But none of these concepts of solution prevented 
core from being empty. However, Shapley introduced 
the concept of balanced coalitions and balanced play 
to determine whether or not the game has an empty 
core.
Given a set (N, v), a collection {S1, S2, …, Sm} of 
the subset of N, distinct and non-empty, is said to be 
balanced on N if there are positive numbers {α1, α2, 
…, αm} - called weights - such that for all i ∈ N,
∑αj = 1
{ ji∈Sj}
(11)
If for any balanced solution on N, it is verified that, 
∑m j=1 αjv(Sj) ≤ v(N), then the set (N, v) is balanced.
Two other solution concepts are the stable sets of 
Von Neumann and the negotiation set of Aumann 
and Maschler. These concepts give solution to coop-
erative games with transferable gains (utility) when 
the sub-set of the imputation set is not empty. There 
are also other proposed solution concepts such as 
the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf-Coleman value, 
which assign each player a single element of the set 
of pre-allocations.
Recently, one of the most recognized solution con-
cepts in the literature has been the Shapley value, 
since it is one of the few values  that meets all the 
properties that the preimputation vector for any 
coalition must have in a cooperative game. Shapley 
came to this value in an axiomatic way, i.e. for each 
value of the game v, there is an n-vector, ∅i (v), that 
fulfills the following axioms: 
1. If xx is a carrier of xx, then:
∑∅i(v) = v(S)
       S
2. For each permutation π**, e i ∈ N, 
∅π(i) πv= ∅iv
3. If u and v are any two games,
∅iu|+ v = ∅iu|+∅iv|
Then the Shapley value is obtained with this for-
mula (12):
∅i(v) =  ∑ (S - 1)!(n - S)! (S) - v(S - {i})
 S∈N:i∈S       n!
When these two conditions are met it is called 
the core. In practice, it is possible for the core to be 
empty, because of the contradictory between the cost 
allocated to a league and the total cost [1]
D. Shapley Value
Shapley value is able to calculate each player’s con-
tribution to possible coalitions in a very precise way. 
Nevertheless, some authors highlighted their compu-
tational complexity as it is observed from Equation 
12 that the way of calculating the value is only deter-
mined after calculating all possible coalitions, which 
for n number of players, it is 2n-1. Thus, a number of 
researchers have developed improved algorithms for 
dealing with this complexity.
Fatima, et al. [2] developed a new approximation 
algorithm to calculate the Shapley value in votes 
games after discovering its computational complex-
ity, this method uses a technique of randomization 
and presents a complexity in real time. In compari-
son to Owen method, this algorithm proved to be bet-
ter in terms of approximation error.
Hong & Yanhong [3] provided a modified algo-
rithm to improve faults in Shapley Value algorithm 
by establishing a condition that ensures that the 
benefits of participants are not reduced if the alli-
ance does not want to disintegrate and that the ad-
ditional benefits are rationally distributed. As result 
of this, was obtained that the new method maintains 
the stability of the alliance and also reaches the 
whole optimum.
Kim [4] proposed an online wireless network rout-
ing algorithm for the energy efficiency and reliability 
of the network, based on a cooperative game model. 
The added value of the scheme developed is related 
to the ability to maintain energy efficiency as high 
as possible, the ability to respond to current network 
conditions for adaptive management, the dynamical-
ly adjustable approach taking into account system 
information in the execution time, and the ability to 
achieve load balancing for real network operations.
Chao-hui [5], developed a new revenue allocation 
strategy based on the Shapley method principle, they 
took into account a risk coefficient, and an invest-
ment to improve the effects of the profits allocation, 
allowing the distribution of benefits reasonably and 
ensuring the persistence of the alliance and stability 
in the supply chain cooperation. This research was 
motivated by the fact that the original algorithm 
cannot fully mobilize the enthusiasm of partners, 
which prevent that cooperation in supply chain man-
agement being totally optimal.
Cui, et al. [6] presented an algorithm to improve 
the Shapley value in concurrent delay claim, which 
can be applied in construction field. The algorithm 
developed is palliative, and in this, time delay re-
sponsibility is allotted to each single responsible ac-
tivity by Shapley Value, and then allotted between 
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the owner and the contractor in each single respon-
sible activity.
Xu, et al. [7] raised a modification of the classical 
Shapley algorithm in order to strengthen technology 
alliances, mainly in RFID and find equal benefits 
under the generated alliances. The modification al-
lowed the authors to calculate the Shapley value for a 
cooperative game and to obtain a payment function.
Muros, et al. [8] presented an alternative way for 
considering constraints on the Shapley value by us-
ing a more computationally efficient design. The new 
method employs a one-step design algorithm that al-
lows to reduce the computational burden.
Castro, et al. [9] proposed a refinement of the 
polynomial method based on sampling theory 
proposed by Castro et al. (2009) to estimate the 
Shapley value for cooperative games, this method 
employ random sampling with optimum allocation 
in order to reduce the variance. The proposed algo-
rithm obtained improvements in situations where 
the variabilities in the marginal contributions of 
each player are very different, or in those situations 
where the variability of the marginal contributions 
depends greatly on each player’s arrival position. 
The most important improvements of these pa-
pers are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Improvements developed.
Research Application Description
Fatima, 
Wooldridge, & 
Jennings [2] • Voting games
• Aproximation algorithm based on randomization.
• Time complexity linear in the number of players.
• Lower approximation error.
Hong & 
Yanhong [3] • General
• The objective is improve the shortcommings of the Shapley value algorithm.
• The new method keeps the stability of the aliance and equitable distribution.
Kim [4]
• Energy efficiency, 
network reliability.
• Adaptive online routing algorithm.
• Each node in algorithm is capable of independently adapting its operation and 
can quickly response to the current network environment changes.
Chao-hui, [5] • General. • The modified method considers risk and investment coefficiece to improve the effects in the revenue allocation.
Cui, et, al. [6]
• Time claim in 
concurrent delay.
• Construction claim 
events.
• Ameliorative algorithm for Shapely Value method.
• The time delay responsibility is allotted to each single responsible activity, and 
then allotted between the owner and the contractor in each single responsible 
activity by means of fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method.
Xu, Yang & 
Wang [7]
• RFID technology 
alliance.
• Payoff function of cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions.
• The improved method is more practical to the cooperative alliance operations.
• The profit allocation for technology alliance is more reasonable.
Muros [8] • Distributed coalitional schemes.
• Inclusion of Shapley constraints in the design procedure that reduces the 
computational burden.
Castro, et 
al [9]
• Symmetric and non- 
symmetric voting 
game, Airport game, 
Shoes game, Minimum 
spanning tree game.
• Polynomial method based on sampling theory.
• Stratified random sampling with optimum allocation in order to reduce the 
variance.
Source: Authors.
Table 2. BasIc data of companIes In the coalItIon.
Companies Net Profit inU$ % tolerable price reduction Expected Profit in U$
PC1 25000 0,03 10000
PC2 15000 0,1 5000
PC3 20000 0,2 8000
PC4 14000 0,05 5000
PC5 22000 0,1 7000
PC6 24000 0,1 9000
Source: Authors.
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III. Proposed Algorithm Applicable to 
Supply Chains
An algorithm to calculate the Shapley Value is pro-
posed in this subsection. This algorithm provides 
improvements in efficiency as a result of a strategy 
to reduce complexity of forming all possible coali-
tions in the game. In the case of supply chains, the 
structure of these chains are known beforehand 
and a set of feasible coalitions are obtained. This 
enables the algorithm to reduce the number of co-
alitions significantly. This algorithm was intro-
duced as a subroutine of a more general strategic 
characterization of businesses in the supply chain. 
The output of this algorithm provides the value at-
tributed to each business (ie. profit, costs, inventory, 
prices, investments). A case study that consideres 
this general characterization for the furniture busi-
ness supply chain was developed by Ramirez-Rios et 
al [10]. (Fig. 1)
IV. Numerical Example 
To illustrate how the proposed algorithm works, a 
simulated scenario was assumed. In this particu-
lar case this scenario was proposed as a hypotheti-
cal case provided in a field survey developed to a 
number of businesses from the furniture industry 
cluster in a particular region of Colombia (Barran-
quilla). The statement provided to the respondents 
were as follows:
“In order to access to new high volume markets, 
the furniture cluster asks you to collaborate with 
the coalition by reducing the prices of your products. 
How much were you disposed to reduce your sale 
prices in order to gain this new market?”
Clearly the answer of this question depends on 
many aspects. Therefore, in order to test the sce-
nario, it was necessary in first place to classify the 
Algorithm SV-SC
n: number of players
i: index of players
S: possible coalitions
s: possible number of players in coalition
m: total of possible number of players in coalition
V(S): value of coalition
Begin
    Determine n, i, S, s, V(S);
 Create matrix [ ];
For k=1 to m, do
    For j=1 to n, do
     Calculate contribution of player j to coalitions with s players
     End
     Calculate probability of coalition with s players
     Obtain accumulated Value of the game
End
     Shapley value ← accumulated Value of the game
 End
Fig. 1. Proposed algorithm pseudocode.
Source: Authors.
1. Suppliers: This group of companies included all 
the suppliers of the furniture producer compa-
nies. Raw material such as wood, fabric, hard-
ware, among others are provided by this echelon 
to the producer’s echelon.
2. Producers: This group of companies included all 
the furniture producers. The products of these 
companies are for example beds, dining room 
furniture, RTA furniture, and others.
3. Marketers: In this group are included all the 
companies that trade the furniture with the fi-
nal costumer. These companies have exhibitions, 
financial incentive for the customers, and all the 
rest of the necessary conditions for and adequate 
final costumer commercialization and service.
The presence of these three echelons makes it 
possible the occurrence of two type of coalitions:
1. Intra-echelon cooperation: In this cooperation 
scheme the actors of a particular echelon are co-
llaborating with their peers in the game.
2. Inter-echelon cooperation: In this cooperation 
scheme the actors of a particular echelon are co-
llaborating with actors of a different echelon.
In the simulated scenario it was assumed that 
the type of collaboration that took place is intra-
echelon collaboration. The scenario was simulated 
with six companies that were willing to cooperate. 
Table 2 shows the relevant data for this scenario, 
for each one of the six companies. The data relat-
ed with their present profit, expected profit, and 
allowed price reduction are crucial to find the ex-
pected benefits of each player considering the dif-
ferent possible coalitions. For example, player PC1 
can form a coalition with PC2. This coalition had a 
game value associated. In this particular case the 
coalition game value is related with the total ex-
companies according to the echelon they correspond 
to, in the furniture value chain. This value chain 
was divided in three echelons as follows:
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In Table 3 the game characteristic function of this 
particular situation can be obtained by represented 
for each coalition in the structure.
For example in the case of coalition between play-
ers CP1 and CP2 de value of the game v({P1,P2}) 
is calculated considering the lesser tolerable price 
reduction for the sum of the present profits of the 
two companies. The resulting value of this operation 
is added to the expected additional profit for both 
companies. In the particular case of v({P1,P2}) the 
lesser price reduction is 3%, and the present profit is 
US 25000 for CP1 and US 15000 for CP2. The sum 
of these two values affected by the reduction of 3% 
amounts US 38800. Finally, the expected additional 
profit is added to this value obtaining the value of 
US 53800. Similar calculations are made in order to 
estimate the game value for each coalition, no mat-
ter the number of members forming them. 
Table 3. Game characterIstIc functIon.
GAME CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION RESULTS (n1, v)
COALITION GAME VALUE COALITION GAME VALUE COALITION GAME VALUE
v({P1}) 25000 v({P1,P2,P3}) 81200 v({P1,P2,P3,P5}) 109540
v({P2}) 15000 v({P1,P2,P4}) 72380 v({P1,P2,P3,P6}) 113480
v({P3}) 20000 v({P1,P2,P5}) 82140 v({P1,P2,P4,P5}) 100720
v({P4}) 14000 v({P1,P2,P6}) 86080 v({P1,P2,P4,P6}) 104660
v({P5}) 22000 v({P1,P3,P4}) 80230 v({P1,P2,P5,P6}) 114420
v({P6}) 24000 v({P1,P3,P5}) 89990 v({P1,P3,P4,P5}) 108570
v({P1,P2}) 53800 v({P1,P3,P6}) 93930 v({P1,P3,P4,P6}) 112510
v({P1,P3}) 61650 v({P1,P4,P5}) 81170 v({P1,P3,P5,P6}) 122270
v({P1,P4}) 52830 v({P1,P4,P6}) 85110 v({P1,P4,P5,P6}) 113450
v({P1,P5}) 62590 v({P1,P5,P6}) 94870 v({P2,P3,P4,P5}) 92450
v({P1,P6}) 66530 v({P2,P3,P4}) 64550 v({P2,P3,P4,P6}) 96350
v({P2,P3}) 44500 v({P2,P3,P5}) 71300 v({P2,P3,P5,P6}) 101900
v({P2,P4}) 37550 v({P2,P3,P6}) 75100 v({P2,P4,P5,P6}) 97250
v({P2,P5}) 45300 v({P2,P4,P5}) 65450 v({P3,P4,P5,P6}) 105000
v({P2,P6}) 49100 v({P2,P4,P6}) 69350 v({P1,P2,P3,P4,P5}) 128120
v({P3,P4}) 45300 v({P2,P5,P6}) 75900 v({P1,P2,P3,P4,P6}) 132060
v({P3,P5}) 52800 v({P3,P4,P5}) 73200 v({P1,P2,P3,P5,P6}) 141820
v({P3,P6}) 56600 v({P3,P4,P6}) 77100 v({P1,P2,P4,P5,P6}) 133000
v({P4,P5}) 46200 v({P3,P5,P6}) 83400 v({P1,P3,P4,P5,P6}) 140850
v({P4,P6}) 50100 v({P4,P5,P6}) 78000 v({P2,P3,P4,P5,P6}) 124250
v({P5,P6}) 57400 v({P1,P2,P3,P4}) 99780 v({P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6}) 160400
Source: Authors.
pected profit for the coalition. In the case of PC1, 
if it faces the scenario by its own its earnings will 
remain the same (U$ 25,000). The same situation 
for PC2, its profit will remain the same (U$ 15000) 
if it works by its own. But if they work together they 
will be able of increasing their profit. In the case of 
PC1 its profit will grow U$ 10,000, and for PC2 the 
profit growth will be of U$ 5,000. In the case of 6 
players there are 6 possible coalitions. 
The number of coalitions can be discriminated as 
follows:
1. Coalitions of 1 player (6 possibilities)
2. Coalitions of 2 players (15 possibilities)
3. Coalitions of 3 players (20 possibilities)
4. Coalitions of 4 players (14 possibilities)
5. Coalitions of 5 players (6 possibilities)
6. Coalitions of 6 players (1 possibility), this one is 
known as the great coalition.
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Once the game value for all the coalitions is cal-
culated the Shapley value is estimated. In this case 
the calculation was done manually and consolidat-
ed in table 4.
In Table 4, rows represent the players, for ex-
ample row 1 represents company CP1 and row 3 
represents company CP3. Columns represent the 
size of coalitions. For instance, column number one 
represents coalitions of size 1 and column 6 repre-
sents coalition with 6 players. This table shows the 
contribution of each player to the coalition of the 
different sizes in which it participates. For example 
the value in row number 1 and column number 2 
is calculated adding the game value of all the co-
alitions of size two in which player one is includ-
ed (v({P1,P2}), v({P1,P3}), v({P1,P4}), v({P1,P5}), 
v({P1,P6})). To this big sum the individual game 
values of the other players are subtracted (v({P2}), 
v({P3}), v({P4}), v({P5}), v({P6})), obtaining the value 
of US 202400. This value is the total contribution of 
player 1 (CP1) to all the possible coalitions of size 2 
that involves CP1 (player 1).
VII. Conclusions and Future Research 
Directions
It is important to recognize the relevance coop-
eration has gained worldwide considering the free 
trade policies that encourage companies to make 
coalitions in order to reduce their costs (transporta-
tion, inventory, etc), and also in order to increase 
customer satisfaction by sharing resources to cover 
warranties, etc. For example, car dealers of different 
brands share their maintenance workshops, to give 
appropriate service to their customers. 
Cooperative game theory is a field with great op-
portunities to do research in order to develop tools 
that help managers, and governments make deci-
sions. In this sense, it is important to continue the 
search for better ways to make the calculation of the 
Shapley value. On the other hand, it is worth noting 
the complexity involved in its calculation and that 
there exist a number of algorithms developed to date 
that try to tackle this complexity. The algorithmic 
approach introduced in this paper does not wish to 
belittle the contributions made so far but intends to 
provide a straightforward solution for decision prob-
lems that involve supply chains. An efficient and 
feasible way of calculating the Shapley Value when 
player structures are known beforehand provides 
the advantage of reducing the amount of effort in 
calculating all possible coalition structures prior to 
the Shapley Value calculation.
The increasing trend in cooperation and sharing 
economies faced in this era have forced companies to 
perform significant changes in their business model 
and organizational structure. It is considered essen-
tial to still preserve the know-how but even more 
important to share information to their suppliers, 
Table 4. consolIdated data for the calculatIon of the shapley value.
Contribution coalitions formed by j palyers
Player i in 
each coalition 1 2 3 4 5 6 ji(v)
1 $25.000,00 $202.400,00 $362.250,00 $366.050,00 $182.900,00 $ 36.150,00 $ 35.173,33
2 $15.000,00 $125.250,00 $191.450,00 $193.550,00 $ 97.450,00 $ 19.550,00 $ 19.598,33
3 $20.000,00 $160.850,00 $268.600,00 $271.400,00 $136.600,00 $ 27.400,00 $ 26.815,00
4 $14.000,00 $125.980,00 $196.270,00 $196.830,00 $ 96.670,00 $ 18.580,00 $ 9.403,33
5 $22.000,00 $166.290,00 $277.460,00 $280.540,00 $141.260,00 $ 28.340,00 $ 27.941,67
6 $24.000,00 $183.730,00 $316.320,00 $319.680,00 $160.920,00 $ 32.280,00 $ 31.468,33
P(j) 0,166666667 0,033333333 0,016666667 0,016666667 0,033333333 0,016666667 $ 160.400
(s-1)!(n-s)!
n!
Player i in 
each 
coalition
1 2 3 4 5 6 ji(v)
1  $         25.000,00  $       202.400,00  $           362.250,00  $         366.050,00  $       182.900,00  $      36.150,00  $    35.173,33 
2  $         15.000,00  $       125.250,00  $           191.450,00  $         193.550,00  $         97.450,00  $      19.550,00  $    19.598,33 
3  $         20.000,00  $       160.850,00  $           268.600,00  $         271.400,00  $       136.600,00  $      27.400,00  $    26.815,00 
4  $         14.000,00  $       125.980,00  $           196.270,00  $         196.830,00  $         96.670,00  $      18.580,00  $    19.403,33 
5  $         22.000,00  $       166.290,00  $           277.460,00  $         280.540,00  $       141.260,00  $      28.340,00  $    27.941,67 
6  $         24.000,00  $       183.730,00  $           316.320,00  $         319.680,00  $       160.920,00  $      32.280,00  $    31.468,33 
P(j) 0,166666667 0,033333333 0,016666667 0,016666667 0,033333333 0,166666667 160.400$             
(s-1)!(n-s)!
n!
Contribution to coalitions formed by j players
{ }
( )}){()(
!
)!()!1()(
:
iSvSv
n
SnSv
SiNS
i −−
−−
= ∑
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φ
Source: Authors.
On the other hand, the row P(j) indicates the 
probability of forming coalitions of a particular 
size. The value of the game for each player includ-
ing all the coalition is obtained by the multiplica-
tion of the player row and P(j) row. In the case of 
player 1 the obtained value is US 35173. This pro-
cedure is the same for the rest of the players, ob-
taining the value 160.400. This value is the value 
of the great coalition. It is important to point that 
this is the expected value of all the possibilities but 
it is useful in order to make a decision to split the 
benefits of coalitions between its members, knowing 
the proportion of participation of each player in the 
total value.
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distributers and other actors of the supply chain. 
Future directions to this research involve studying 
other forms of cooperation and introducing new ap-
plications as a way of evidencing the need for cooper-
ation in the different industries. Not only the supply 
chain but also other forms of cooperation can be in-
troduced in the organization (i.e, operations, trans-
portation logistics, innovation processes, design, 
and knowledge management). Until now cooperation 
has enabled companies face the issues that come 
with globalization and new markets, thus a fast and 
robust decision-making tool must be provided.
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